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HISTORY
ROUTE 2
HIGHER LEVEL AND STANDARD LEVEL
PAPER 1 – THE ARAB–ISRAELI CONFLICT 1945–79

Thursday 12 May 2011 (afternoon)

1 hour

International Baccalaureate®
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INSTRUCTIONS TO CANDIDATES

- Do not open this examination paper until instructed to do so.
- Answer all the questions.

Read all the sources carefully and answer all the questions that follow.

Sources in this paper have been edited: word additions or explanations are shown in square brackets [ ]; substantive deletions of text are indicated by ellipses … ; minor changes are not indicated.

These sources and questions relate to the role of the United States in the Suez Crisis of 1956.

SOURCE A   *Extract from **A History of the Arab–Israeli Conflict** by Ian J Bickerton and Carla Klausner, 2007.*

During 1956, United States' policy in the Middle East was to neutralize the Arab–Israeli conflict, convince Arabs and Israelis to join the West against the Soviets and maintain oil supplies to the West … But Arab nationalists saw the United States as an ally of the colonial powers and a supporter of Israel … Egypt's president Nasser, a nationalist, wanted the removal of Western influence from the Middle East, to modernize Egypt, to promote pan-Arabism and to eradicate Israel … Eisenhower's Secretary of State, Dulles, offered Nasser, in return for concessions, economic aid for military equipment and to build the Aswan Dam … Nasser, however, would not conform … When Dulles decided not to sell Nasser arms, Nasser turned to the Soviet Union and purchased arms from Czechoslovakia, and recognized Communist China. … Dulles withdrew United States' support for the Aswan Dam. In retaliation, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal to use its profits to build the dam.

SOURCE B   *Extract from a letter from British prime minister Anthony Eden to Eisenhower on 27 July 1956. Taken from **The Suez Crisis** by Anthony Gorst and Lewis Johnman, 1997.*

We cannot allow Nasser to seize control of the Canal in defiance of international agreements … If we do, our influence and yours throughout the Middle East will be destroyed … The Canal is vital to the free world … the Egyptians' complete lack of technical qualifications and their behaviour show that they cannot be trusted to manage it. … We should not be involved in legal quibbles [quarrels] about rights to nationalize an Egyptian company, or in financial arguments about their capacity to pay the compensation. We should bring maximum political pressure to bear on Egypt and in the last resort, to use force … the first step must be for you and us and France to exchange views and align our policies.

SOURCE C   *Extract from **Eisenhower and the Suez Crisis of 1956** by Cole C Kingseed, 1995.*

The nationalization of the Suez Canal threatened many states … the British saw its oil supply and strategic control of the Middle East endangered … France saw Egypt as a supplier of arms for Algerian rebels; and a reinforcement of Nasser's influence over North Africa … Israel was worried about interference with their shipping rights through the canal and further encouragement of the Palestinian guerrilla campaign … Without consulting their American ally in advance, the three countries devised and executed a plan to retaliate against Egypt … The Soviet Union branded Britain, France and Israel as "aggressors" and threatened to intervene militarily in defense of Egypt … Moscow contacted Washington with a view to a joint US–Soviet military operation against them. Eisenhower rejected this proposal … Nevertheless, Eisenhower was furious, and shouted: "Tell them that we're going to apply sanctions, we're going to the United Nations, and we're going to do everything that there is so we can stop this thing!"

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SOURCE D   *Extract from president Eisenhower's address to the nation on 31 October 1956. Taken from* **The Cold War: A History Through Documents** *by Edward H Judge and John W Langdon, 1999.*

Matters came to a crisis when the Egyptian government seized the Suez Canal … some among our allies urged a reaction by force. We urged otherwise, and our wish prevailed, through a long succession of conferences and negotiations …   But the direct relations of Egypt with both Israel and France kept worsening to a point at which they determined that there could be no protection of their vital interests without resort to force …   The United States was not consulted in any way about any phase of these actions. … these actions were taken in error. We do not accept the use of force for the settlement of international disputes. To say this is not to minimize our friendship with these nations …   But their action can scarcely be reconciled with the principles of the United Nations to which we have all subscribed …   Yesterday we went to the United Nations with a request that hostilities in the area be brought to a close. The proposal was vetoed by Great Britain and by France …   We intend to bring this matter before the United Nations General Assembly. There, with no veto operating, the opinion of the world can be brought to bear in our quest for a just end to this problem.

SOURCE E   *A cartoon by Leslie Gilbert Illingworth, a British cartoonist, published on 1 January 1957. Leslie Gilbert Illingworth worked for* **Punch** *and the* **Daily Mail***.*

"Who will catch the Middle East?"

By permission of The National Library of Wales and the Daily Mail

Eisenhower is shown as a cowboy with a rope and Khrushchev as an Arab. Both are trying to catch a runaway camel labelled "Middle East". Anthony Eden is on the floor in the background.

1. (a) What, according to Source C, were the reactions of the powers mentioned to the nationalization of the Suez Canal? *[3 marks]*

(b) What is the message conveyed by Source E? *[2 marks]*

2. Compare and contrast the views expressed in Sources B and D about the Suez Crisis. *[6 marks]*

3. With reference to their origin and purpose, assess the value and limitations of Source A and Source C for historians studying the Suez Crisis of 1956. *[6 marks]*

4. Using the sources and your own knowledge, evaluate the role played by the United States in the Suez Crisis of 1956. *[8 marks]*

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